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 Power-dependence theory begins with the proposition that the power of one actor is 
based on the opponent’s dependence on that actor—that is, the power of actor A is based on 
actor B’s dependence on the benefits that can be provided by A, while the power of actor B is 
based on A’s dependence on the benefits that can be provided by B (Bacharach and Lawler, 
1981a; Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962 and 1972). A crucial aspect of this proposition is that each 
actor’s power is based on the other’s dependence rather than on his own. In labor-management 
relations, labor’s power is based on management’s dependence on the union and its members, 
while management’s power is based on the union and its members’ dependence on management. 
 The dependence theory of bargaining power is a worthy competitor of other theories of 
power in general or bargaining power in particular (Dunlop, 1950; Chamberlain, 1951 and 1955; 
French and Raven, 1959; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma, 1973; Wrong, 1968). It offers a 
multidimensional conceptualization of power; it adopts a tactical approach to the bargaining 
process; and it treats the outcomes of bargaining, in part, as products of the tactics and 
countertactics that constitute the bargaining process. Overall, power-dependence theory allows 
for a more dynamic analysis of power than that offered by many other theories, one that can 
incorporate both the short-run and long-run effects of certain tactical patterns (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1980, chap. 7; 1981a).1 
 The purpose of this paper is to review and extend the implications of a dependence theory 
of bargaining power. This theory advances a much more complex conception of power than is 
typically found in either the general literature on power or the collective bargaining literature. 
The paper will identify certain paradoxes posed by dependence theory. These paradoxes help to 
illustrate the value of the theory in understanding the power relationships between labor and 
management, how these relationships can change over time, and how tactical action within 
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particular contract negotiations can produce positive effects on the relationship that are not 
intended by actors. For example, Emerson (1972), who first delineated the general features of 
power-dependence theory, suggested one such paradox: “To use power is to lose it.” This is a 
rather provocative—and to some, perhaps, a seemingly ludicrous—notion that actually makes 
sense if one considers the longer-term effects of tactical actions that take place in particular 
collective bargaining negotiations. In our earlier work, we modified power-dependence theory 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a) and suggested that tactical efforts to change the power 
relationship can, under some conditions, have an integrative effect on labor-management 
relations, thus posing another paradox that the use of power does not necessarily have negative 
or disintegrative consequences. 
 This paper portrays labor-management relations as ä “power struggle” and, by examining 
several of the paradoxes, suggests that our conception of power-dependence theory (Bacharach 
and Lawler, 1981a; 1981b) offers a promising start toward an examination of this power 
struggle. Four basic paradoxes are suggested by a dependence theory of bargaining power. Each 
of these paradoxes demonstrates the potential of the dependence framework for understanding 
the longer-term implications of tactical action in a given set of negotiations. The paradoxes 
assume that the actors negotiating at a particular time have and expect to have a continuing, 
long-term relationship with each other. The four paradoxes are as follows: 
 
1. Power is based on giving. 
2. To use power is to lose it. 
3. Power may have integrative rather than disintegrative effects on a labor-management 
relationship. 
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4. Inferior power can provide an actor a tactical advantage. 
 
 An elaboration of the paradoxes will show why such simplistic notions as “high-power 
actors invariably win in negotiations” are misleading if not inaccurate. In addition, the paradoxes 
serve to illustrate how the dependence framework can offer a better understanding of the effect 
of particular contract negotiations on the larger and continuing relationship between labor and 
management. Before examining the paradoxes, however, it is important to discuss our underlying 
assumptions about labor-management relations, the concept of power, and the bargaining actors. 
 
I. ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Labor-Management Relations as a Power Struggle 
 
 The longer-term relationship between labor and management is conceptualized in power-
dependence theory as an ongoing power struggle in which the actors attempt to maneuver 
themselves into advantageous power positions. Much of what each side, either labor or 
management, does can be construed as efforts (at least in part) either to improve its own power 
position or to undermine the other’s. To enhance its power, for example, the union attempts to 
create internal solidarity, maintain substantial strike funds, exercise influence over internal labor 
markets, and manipulate management’s perceptions of the union, of workers’ contribution to the 
organization, and of market conditions affecting workers in the bargaining unit. At the same 
time, to enhance its power, management may build inventories in preparation for a strike, 
subcontract for certain services, and manipulate workers’ perceptions of the comparisons 
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appropriate for assessing pay levels and their perceptions of the intangible benefits provided by 
the firm’s working conditions. The power relationship that is brought to, interpreted, and enacted 
at the bargaining table is initially established outside contract negotiations. This power 
relationship provides the context for the tactics employed by the parties at the bargaining table, 
and these tactics are usually designed by one party to alter the other’s perception of the power 
relationship. 
 What does it mean to say that labor-management relations should be viewed as a power 
struggle? This viewpoint is not necessarily new; in fact, it is probably implicit in most previous 
behavioral research on collective bargaining. What appears to be lacking in the previous 
literature, however, is the explicit and systematic development of a framework for grasping the 
power struggle that underlies labor-management relationships. If we take this conception of 
labor-management relations seriously, it suggests the following. First, the interaction of labor 
and management is best conceived as a sequence of tactics and countertactics in the context of a 
conflict of interest. The conflict of interest is inherent in the very nature of the relationship, and 
the tactical aspect of the interaction is the most crucial part of the bargaining process. Second, 
any given interaction (in other words, tactic-countertactic) sequence occurs in the context of an 
ongoing, longer- term power struggle. Individual contract negotiations must be placed in the 
context of this broader power struggle. Third, to understand the power struggle, one needs a 
conception of bargaining power designed not just to predict the outcome of particular 
negotiations but to analyze the effects of particular negotiations on the larger power struggle. 
Conversely, the effects of the larger power struggle on individual negotiations must also be 
analyzed. We contend that power-dependence theory provides the basis for such an analysis. 
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The Concept of Power 
 
 The concept of power has a muddled and confusing history. Various conceptualizations 
of power have been offered in the bargaining literature (for example, Chamberlain, 1951; 
Dunlop, 1950; Stevens, 1963; Tedeschi and Bonoma, 1972) and in the broader social science 
literatures (for example, Bierstedt, 1950; Dahl, 1957; Gamson, 1968). Those who have presented 
their own theories about power have tended to ignore other formulations, and those who have 
conducted empirical research on power have tended to adopt an operational stance that obviates 
the need to consider the theoretical aspects of the concept. As a result, the net product of these 
various studies has been to show only loose connections between the concept of power and its 
operationalization in particular research studies. Variable and inconsistent uses of the term have 
led some authors to suggest that the concept is useless and others to ignore it altogether (see 
Lindblom, 1948, and Schelling, 1960 for two noteworthy examples). 
 Our approach to power differs from most other conceptualizations in three basic ways. 
First, we assume that power is best treated as a heuristic concept. Much of the other work on 
power assumes it can and should be a precise, well-defined term that can be operationalized in 
concrete terms. By contrast, we argue that the existing work on power prematurely attempts to 
impose a level of precision on the term power that is inappropriate (see Bacharach and Lawler, 
1980, 10-26; 1981a, 41-103; Blumer, 1969; Hage, 1972; Stinchcombe, 1968). Despite the 
inherent ambiguity of heuristic terms, they often serve the following functions: they reveal the 
complexity of phenomena that might otherwise be treated in an oversimplified or unidimensional 
manner; they serve to integrate seemingly disparate ideas; and they eventually lead to more 
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precise, well-defined ideas. From our standpoint, the concept of power should be viewed as a 
heuristic device that serves to carry out these three functions. 
 The second difference between our approach to power and most others is that we assume 
that bargaining power is subjective in nature (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a, 48-52). Research on 
power in collective bargaining is often based on an economic paradigm. Although the economic 
and behavioral paradigms differ in important respects, both stress the objective nature of power 
relationships (Lewin and Feuille, 1983). Our perspective assumes that conveying an impression 
of power will yield the same consequence as having “real” power; manipulating an opponent’s 
perception of the power relationship will have the same effect as an actual change in that 
relationship. The “objective” or “real” power relationship sets broad constraints or parameters 
within which actors attempt to manipulate each other’s perceptions. But given the ambiguity 
inherent in such information, as well as the tactical nature of bargaining, the cognitive use and 
manipulation of “objective” conditions is more important to an understanding of bargaining than 
the objective conditions themselves. In fact, we argue that the objective sources of labor’s and 
management’s power are important only to the degree that bargainers take account of, interpret, 
and use them at the bargaining table (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a). 
 The third basic difference between our approach and others is that we draw a sharp 
distinction among potential power, the use of power, and the^ outcome or result of power usage. 
Rather than define power solely in terms of only one of these dimensions, we view power as a 
process through which actors intertwine power potential, usage, and outcomes. This approach 
avoids the tautological problem with conceptions of power based solely on outcomes (see Dahl, 
1957; Dunlop, 1950); avoids the problems caused by neglecting tactics, problems that afflict 
conceptions of power based solely on potential (Bierstedt, 1950; Chamberlain, 1955; Wrong, 
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1968); and avoids ignoring the relationships between the tactical aspects of bargaining and the 
potential power embedded in the structural or environment^ context. Our approach makes the 
links between potential power, tactical action, and the outcomes of bargaining a theoretical and 
empirical issue rather than a matter of definition. We believe it is inappropriate to assume that 
potential power will be used effectively or even used at all; it is inappropriate to assume that 
variations in outcomes of bargaining necessarily reflect variations in potential power; and it is 
inappropriate to assume that unused power has no influence on bargaining. 
 In summary, the power relationship is not a static structural phenomenon, even though 
some features of it are relatively stable. Instead, the power relationship is a cognitive 
construction that evolves and changes in the course of actual bargaining. The changes are a 
function of tactical action so that the power relationship is, in part, an outgrowth of bargaining. 
An existing power relationship, as perceived by the actors, serves as a context for current 
negotiations, which in turn modify and adjust the power relationship. 
 
Bargaining Actors as Imperfect Calculators 
 
 The basic thrust of the power-dependence framework can be illustrated with reference to 
the standard distinction between the bargaining environment, the bargaining process, and 
bargaining outcomes. These three facets of the collective bargaining relationship have provided 
the foundation for a variety of research strategies. Game theorists and economists, however, 
generally neglect the process and focus on the prediction of outcomes based on simplified 
assumptions about the parties’ utility functions (see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a; 
Harsanyi, 1977; Young, 1975). Scholars in the collective bargaining field, on the other hand, 
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have typically attempted to relate the environment to outcomes and, in some cases, to the 
bargaining process (Kochan, 1980). There have been few attempts, however, to develop 
analytical frameworks that integrate all three dimensions of the bargaining relationship. 
 In our earliest work, we attempted to provide an integrated framework (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981a). We argued that although the three dimensions of the bargaining relationship are 
distinct, the task the bargaining actors face is to cognitively link the environment, the process, 
and outcomes» For example, the bargaining relationship between labor and management occurs 
within specific external constraints. It is the role of bargained to interpret the external constraints 
and translate them into tactics that can be used at the bargaining table. Through the bargaining 
process (whether it takes place within formal contract negotiations or in less formal discussions 
between contract negotiations), the parties translate the larger environment surrounding the 
negotiations into tactical actions designed to produce specific bargaining outcomes. 
 The bargaining actors themselves, therefore, forge the links between the environment, the 
process (or tactics), and outcomes. They develop tactical options, link those options to 
opportunities embedded in the environmental conditions, and elect options that they believe will 
have the greatest positive impact on their outcomes. Actors must be calculative because of the 
ambiguity and uncertainty that intrinsically pervade a bargaining relationship (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981a; 1981b). But the fact that they are calculative does not mean that they are 
“rational” in the strict sense. It would be better to say that they are decision makers who search 
for and process information imperfectly and who utilize a “rational” process, namely, means-
ends thinking, without necessarily reaching a “rational” result.2 
 It is our contention that an examination of bargaining outcomes should not deal 
exclusively with the economic or institutional environment, but should also stress the motives 
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and intentions—that is, the calculative processes—of the bargaining actors as well as the 
evolving character of the power relationship. We take this broad view because we believe 
bargaining power must be the focal variable of any theory of bargaining that seeks to intertwine 
environment, process, and outcomes. Bargaining power must be examined in terms of its micro 
behavioral manifestations rather than in terms of its macro environmental antecedents. Thus, 
although aggregate economic measures (such as the unemployment rate and the percentage of 
employees who are members of a union) may be good indicators of bargaining power, they must 
be understood in terms of the tactical actions undertaken by actors in bargaining. 
 Tactical action may be (1) based on the power relationship implied by such macro 
indicators; (2) designed to overcome the disadvantages inherent in the macro indicators; or (3) 
designed to modify the power relationship. These alternative means of responding to a power 
advantage or disadvantage created by the same environmental or structural conditions suggest 
that the relationship between power and tactical action is quite complex. A bargainer with little 
power will not necessarily engage in tactical action that is consistent with that power but may 
attempt to overcome it by clever tactical manipulations; by the same token, a party with great 
power may sacrifice favorable outcomes in the short run (and appear to lose in current 
negotiations) to preserve a long-term power advantage. The clearest lesson of our previous work 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1976; 1981a; 1981b; Lawler and Bacharach, 1976; 1979; 1983) is the 
importance of rejecting oversimplified, unidimensional, structurally based conceptions of power 
that neglect the dynamic, tactical quality of power processes. 
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II. THE DEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK 
 
 Chamberlain (1951; 1955) and Pen (1959) based their theories of bargaining power on 
the proposition that bargaining is a social-exchange relationship in which each actor needs 
resources controlled by the other. Consistent with related work by social psychologists (Blau, 
1964; Emerson, 1962; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Cook and Emerson, 1978 and 1984), they 
specifically suggested that a bargaining relationship is grounded in two conditions: a scarcity of 
resources that fosters competition among those who need them; and an uneven allocation of 
resources that makes it possible and potentially profitable for actors in competition to exchange 
the different resources they each need. Labor and management are likely to maintain a 
bargaining relationship if each perceives that the other is able to provide benefits more readily 
and completely than other potential actors with whom they might negotiate. In other words, 
bargaining is based on the dependence of each actor on resources controlled by the other. For 
Chamberlain and Pen, dependence is essentially a defining characteristic of a bargaining 
relationship; for us, it is a dimension along which there is a substantial variation within and 
across bargaining relationships, and it is the foundation for bargaining power. 
 Dependence theory further stipulates that dependence is grounded in two basic 
conditions: the availability of alternative sources of outcomes; and the degree of commitment to 
the outcomes at stake in the bargaining. Actor A’s power, therefore, is greater than B’s to the 
degree that B is highly committed to the outcomes at stake and has poor alternative outcome 
sources outside of A; conversely, B’s power is based on A’s commitment and A’s alternative 
providers. Each dimension of dependence (alternatives and commitment) is elaborated below. 
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 By the term alternatives, we mean similar or substitutable outcomes from other 
relationships. In applying the concept of alternative outcome sources to collective bargaining, it 
is important that we distinguish between the macro and the micro level. At the macro or 
organizational level, unions and firms normally are highly dependent on each other, given the 
institutional structures that govern and regulate union-management relationships; furthermore, 
the level of dependence at the organizational level may be relatively constant. If the level is 
constant for each party in the collective bargaining relationship, dependence theory would not be 
helpful in analyzing macro qua macro features of collective bargaining. Of course, the 
perceptions of union dependence on a firm may still vary, and some variation may occur across 
issues. The dependence of the union on the firm, however, is likely to be affected mainly by the 
dependence of its workers on the firm (and the firm’s dependence on the union will be based 
mainly on its dependence on the union’s members). In other words, the dependence of the macro 
entities is essentially determined at the micro level. 
 It should be obvious that the individual members of a union typically have more 
alternative sources of outcomes than does the union itself. It is easier for a worker to quit his job 
than for a union to sever its relationship with a firm. The potential for manipulating perceptions 
of power is also greater at the individual level. Even if the job market for workers is poor, for 
example, union representatives may still be able to persuade management that highly skilled 
workers are irreplaceable and that they will leave unless management makes certain concessions. 
Similarly, management may threaten to reduce its demand for workers with particular skills by 
introducing technological changes or by modifying production priorities. Despite the macro level 
dependencies that are intrinsic to union-management relationships, it is clear that alternative 
outcomes sources can and do exist, primarily at the micro level. 
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 By the term commitment, we mean the subjective importance the actor attaches to the 
outcomes at issue. The concept of commitment has been given several different labels over the 
years, from “motivational investment” in the early work of Emerson (1962) and the “value of a 
reinforcer” in later operant conditioning theories (Emerson, 1972) to the “value of the outcomes” 
in our earlier work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1976; 1980; Lawler and Bacharach, 1976; 1979). 
The term commitment is designed to eliminate some of the misleading connotations of those 
other terms, but it is important to distinguish it from Schelling’s (1960) notion of commitment. 
To Schelling, commitment refers to a specific behavior that conveys an irrevocable 
determination to pursue a larger line of action (such as “burning bridges behind you”). 
Commitment in our dependence framework simply refers to an actor’s perception of the 
importance of the outcomes at issue in the relationship. 
 Dependence theory treats a party’s alternative outcome sources and its commitment to the 
outcomes as analytically distinct phenomena. Although that is a theoretically reasonable 
position, these dimensions of dependence clearly can be interrelated in empirical instances. This 
interrelationship is suggested by both classical economic and operant conditioning interpretations 
of these dimensions. The operant conditioning interpretation, for example, takes commitment to 
mean the value of the reinforcer and stipulates that this value is a function of the scarcity of the 
reinforcement. The potential relationships between alternatives and commitment, however, does 
not appear to be much of a problem for dependence theory. The theory is not concerned with the 
relationship between alternatives and value per se; moreover, the analytic distinction has 
important tactical implications. The most crucial question posed by dependence theory is how 
actors use the dimensions of dependence to develop plans of action and select among tactical 
options. It is clear from our research that in answering this question it is critical to distinguish 
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between alternative outcome sources and commitment (Bacharach and Lawler, 1976; 1981a; 
Lawler and Bacharach, 1976; 1979). More specifically, we have demonstrated empirically that 
actors in bargaining behave as if these are distinct dimensions of power. 
 The fundamental proposition of dependence theory is quite simple: an actor’s bargaining 
power should be greater, the poorer the opponent’s alternative outcomes sources and the greater 
the opponent’s commitment to the outcomes at stake. Applied to labor-management 
relationships, this proposition translates into four hypotheses (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a, 63): 
 
1. If the quality of a union’s (or its members’) alternative outcome sources decreases, 
management’s bargaining power increases. 
2. If the quality of management’s alternative outcome sources decreases, the union’s 
bargaining power increases. 
3. If the union’s (or its members’) commitment to the outcomes at issue in the relationship 
increases, management’s bargaining power increases. 
4. If management’s commitment to the outcomes at issue increases, the union’s bargaining 
power increases. 
 
 Previous empirical work in laboratory experiments has provided support for these 
hypotheses. The results for the alternatives dimension, however, are stronger and more consistent 
than those for commitment. The primary reason for this difference is that an actor’s high 
commitment to the outcomes controlled by an opponent has tactical implications that sometimes 
overcome the power disadvantage implied by that commitment. In accordance with dependence 
theory, high commitment by A means that B controls A’s access to outcomes that are quite 
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important to A, thereby giving3 more power than A. High commitment by A, however, may also 
motivate A to exert more tactical effort and, other things being equal, to achieve greater 
influence than would be suggested by A’s power position (see, especially, Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981a, 80-103; Lawler and Bacharach, 1979). These serendipitous findings for 
commitment document the importance of analyzing separately the tactical implications of the 
two power dimensions. Moreover, they call into question the commonsense view that high power 
necessarily yields concommitantly high influence in negotiations. 
 One of the unique features of dependence theory is that it adopts a variable-sum 
conception of power (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a), rather than the zero-sum conception found 
in most of the previous literature. Whereas a zero-sum conception assumes that when a union 
increases its own bargaining power, it decreases management’s bargaining power to an equal 
degree (and vice versa), a variable-sum conception makes no assumption about the effect of an 
increase or decrease in one actor’s bargaining power on the other’s power. A variable-sum 
approach transforms the question of the relationship of one actor’s power to the other’s into an 
empirical one. There may be a negative relationship, consistent with a zero-sum approach, or the 
power of both actors may increase or decrease. The major difference between the zero-sum and 
variable-sum approaches is that the former assumes a fixed level of total power in the 
relationship and a perfect negative relationship between the power of labor and the power of 
management, whereas the latter assumes that the total power in the relationship can change 
because of changes in the environment or changes in the tactical actions pursued by the two 
actors over time (see Bacharach and Lawler, 1981, 64-68). 
 Dependence theory’s variable-sum conception of power allows a distinction between 
relative power (the power difference between the actors) and total power (mutual dependence) in 
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the bargaining relationship. The relative power of A can be expressed as the ratio of A’s 
dependence on B to B’s dependence on A. Total power refers to the sum of A’s dependence on B 
and B’s dependence on A. Although total power and relative power in any given relationship are 
probably interrelated, it is important to recognize that the same degree of relative power can 
occur with different degrees of total power, and the same degree of total power may occur with 
different degrees of relative power. The concept of total power and the related variable-sum 
assumption about the connection between the levels of power of the two actors is crucial to an 
application of dependence theory to the power struggle, as our subsequent discussion will 
demonstrate. 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK 
 
 The remainder of this paper will examine several paradoxes that are posed by power-
dependence theory. Each paradox illustrates the uniqueness of dependence theory while also 
suggesting how the theory helps to explain the power struggle over time. Our previous work 
emphasized the shortterm uses and effects of power dependence (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981a; 
Lawler and Bacharach, 1976); our discussion here will elucidate the implications of the theory 
for the analysis of ongoing power struggles. 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        17 
 
Paradox 1: Power is Based on Giving 
 
 The broadest practical implication of dependence theory is that to gain power, a party 
must make his opponent dependent on him. How does a party accomplish this? By providing 
benefits to the opponent. Thus, on the most basic level, the power of labor is based on the 
benefits it provides to management, and the power of management is based on the benefits it 
provides to labor. The_ major challenge confronting both labor and management, of course, is 
that each wants to use the benefits it provides the other to extract more benefits in return; that is, 
each wants to give the other something it does not value (but which the other values highly) and 
receive in return something it does value highly. 
 From the standpoint of theory, power maximization means that labor or management 
maximizes the difference between what it provides the other party and what the other party can 
acquire from alternative outcome sources. To illustrate, let us simplify the dependence 
relationship and assume that there are four basic types of benefits: the benefit labor obtains from 
management (L), the benefit management obtains from labor (M), the prospective benefit that 
labor can obtain from alternative outcome sources (Lalt), and the prospective benefit that 
management can obtain from alternative sources (Malt). Labor’s dependence on management is 
simply a function of the difference between the benefit labor receives from management and that 
which it can acquire from alternative outcome sources (L - Lalt); management’s dependence on 
labor is similarly a function of the difference between the benefit management receives from the 
union (and its workers) and the benefit it can acquire from alternative outcome sources (M - 
Malt). If each actor in an ongoing bargaining relationship seeks Jo improve its power position in 
the long run, it has an incentive to provide significantly greater benefits than the prospective 
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benefits its opponent can obtain from alternative outcome sources. If the union (management) 
seeks to maximize its power, it should attempt to maximize the difference between M and Malt 
(L and Lalt). But to the degree that M(L) is valued by labor (management), the motivation to 
maximize this difference should diminish and the motivation to optimize, or reach a difference 
that would produce the maximum power at the minimum costs, should increase. 
 There are two ways for a party to maximize the opponent’s dependence (and hence the 
party’s own power): by providing more benefits to the opponent or by decreasing the benefits the 
opponent can obtain from alternative sources. The provision of more benefits is the most feasible 
method because it is clearly under the party’s control. Cutting off the opponent from alternatives 
can be time consuming and costly, but over the long run it is a tactic that is often adopted by both 
labor and management. For example, unions and employers frequently vie for control over the 
supply of workers. Unions may attempt to impose strict union security arrangements (the closed 
shop) and rigid hiring standards on employers, while employers may resist such demands. If 
management accedes to such demands, its opportunity to hire nonunion workers is restricted and 
consequently its dependence on the union is increased. In general, however, providing benefits 
rather than restricting alternatives is the most readily available tactic for maximizing the 
dependence of an opponent. The trick, of course, is for the party to identify benefits that are not 
costly to supply. 
 One of the major implications of this first paradox is that there are circumstances in 
which a short-run loss will increase the power an actor can wield in future encounters with his 
opponent. Paradoxically, a party’s accepting a disadvantageous agreement in one set of contract 
negotiations may not necessarily render the party weak in the next contract negotiations and 
beyond. Capitulation, or at least making significant concessions, may be a strategic move 
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whereby short-term losses that enhance the opponents dependence on the capitulator lead to 
long-term benefits for the capitulator. In fact, one might argue that the wage concessions made 
by unions in recent years (other things equal) were designed to enhance their power in the future, 
or at least to stem the rate of decline in their power. Thus, if labor and management view their 
relationship as an ongoing power struggle, “winning” in particular contract negotiations may 
actually weaken the winner’s future power position, and “losing” in particular contract 
negotiations may enhance the loser’s future power position. Our purpose is not to give labor or 
management such advice, but to suggest that, in theory, the dependence framework yields some 
implications that are counterintuitive to a more simplistic view of the ongoing power struggle. 
 
Paradox 2: To Use Power Is to Lose It 
 
 According to dependence theory, the “use” of power inherently involves coercion 
(Emerson, 1972; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, chap. 8). Coercion is behavior that increases the 
opponent’s costs, and two forms of coercion are specifically suggested by the theory: increasing 
the benefits received from the opponent, and reducing the benefits provided to the opponent. 
If labor, for example, has the capacity to provide management with benefits, then it also has the 
capacity to withhold those benefits, or at least to make the provision of those benefits more 
costly to management. In this sense, labor’s provision of benefits intrinsically implies a threat to 
management of withholding those benefits. This implied threat may enable management to 
extract substantial wage concessions from a union at a particular time, just as it might enable the 
union to extract substantial wage increases at another time. If giving is the foundation of 
dependence and power, however, there are serious limitations on each actor’s ability to coerce 
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the other—not in the short run, but in the long run. A union that extracts large wage increases 
over time may cause management to reduce labor costs by means of layoffs or mechanization. 
By losing, its power to achieve short-term goals, therefore, labor runs the risk of undermining its 
ability to extract substantial concessions in future bargaining. 
 Analytically, the effect of the two forms of coercion—increasing the benefits received 
from the opponent and reducing the benefits provided to the opponent—can be explained with 
the simplified formulation used in the previous subsection. The coercive capability of labor is the 
equivalent of management’s dependence on labor (M - Malt); and conversely, the coercive 
capability of management is equivalent to the union’s dependence on management (L - Lalt). 
The use of coercion by labor involves either a reduction in M (the benefits labor provides to 
management) or an increase in L (the benefits labor obtains from management). 
 Now consider the effect of these two forms of coercion on the power relationship. First, if 
labor reduces the benefits it gives to management (M) in a set of contract negotiations, labor’s 
power diminishes because managements’ dependence on the union declines (that is, the 
difference between M and Malt declines). Second, if labor increases the amount of benefits it 
receives from management (that is, the difference between L and Lalt increases), labor’s 
dependence on management increases and, hence, management’s power increases. Both means 
of coercion thus actually undermine labor’s power vis-a-vis management’s over time (assuming, 
of course, that the alternative outcome sources available to both actors remain constant). 
Coercion, therefore, may be a very useful strategy for achieving short-term benefits; but in a 
bargaining relationship that continues over time, it can have serious long-term effects on an 
actor’s power. 
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 The most extreme scenario is one in which labor reduces M to the point that it is equal to 
or less than Malt. In our formulation of dependence theory, such a scenario would destroy the 
relationship. A union that extracts outcomes from management that are so large that plant 
closings and massive layoffs result has obviously overlooked the longer-term implications of its 
coercive tactics. The same tactical error on management’s part would be to force the union to 
accept a contract so unfavorable that it results in such losses to management as wildcat strikes, 
contract enforcement problems, theft, damaged products, absenteeism, or turnover. Dependence 
theory suggests that the development and maintenance of harmonious relations between labor 
and management may require that both actors recognize their strong mutual dependence on each 
other. 
 Dependence theory predicts that strikes will be most effective when the union and its 
members have made themselves indispensable to management, that is, when management is 
highly dependent on the union. Extrapolating from the foregoing analysis, however, leads to the 
prediction that strikes are likely to be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, a strike may force 
management to realize that it is dependent on the union. On the other hand, if a firm manages to 
maintain a certain level of production during the course of a strike^ its managers may come to 
believe that they are less dependent on the union than they had previously thought. A strike can 
affect the long-term power relationship between labor and management in two general ways: 
first, by “testing” and modifying the perceptions of power each of them uses to guide their 
tactical action in the immediate situation and beyond; and second, by modifying the flow of 
benefits to each of them in the short run. In both cases, the longer-run dependence of the parties 
is affected. 
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        22 
 
 Our analysis of the paradox “To use power is to lose it” warrants an important caveat. 
Although this paradox is a defensible theoretical implication of dependence theory, it is not an 
inevitable consequence of the actual use of power. First, the term use of power in this context 
refers only to coercive action, namely, reducing the benefits given to or increasing the benefits 
taken from the other actor. Second, for power use to lead to a deterioration of the user’s power, 
we must assume that there is no change in the prospective benefits from alternative outcome 
sources. Recall that the dependence of management on the union is based not only on the 
benefits provided to management but on the comparison of those benefits with alternatives. 
Third, environmental changes (in government regulations or the economy, for example) may 
counteract the effect of power use on an actor’s future power. Despite these qualifications, 
however, dependence theory suggests that the high mutual dependence that is probably essential 
to integrative labor-management relationships is likely to be undermined by frequent resort to 
coercive action. 
 
Paradox 3: Power Can Have Integrative Effects on Labor-Management Relations 
 
 Most of the actions taken at the bargaining table can be construed as attempts to 
manipulate the opponent’s perceptions of the power relationship. Given the time constraints 
faced by negotiators, each is likely to operate on the assumption that the power relationship 
between the two parties is relatively fixed and attempt to manipulate the other’s interpretation of 
information on the nature of the power relationship. In contrast, during the term of the contract, 
both the union and management are likely to undertake tactical actions that engender real 
changes in the power relationship—changes that will be perceived as such by the opponent. 
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Producing changes in the actual power relationship will typically require more time than is 
available at the bargaining table. Overall, however, the perceptual or cognitive aspects of power 
remain critical. The primary difference between tactical action during contract negotiations and 
during the contract term is the means employed to manipulate the other party’s perceptions of the 
power relationship: an actor can attempt to produce real changes that will then be reflected in 
power perceptions; or an actor can attempt to induce shifts in an opponent’s interpretations of an 
existing power relationship. These options, of course, are not mutually exclusive. 
 The types of tactical options available; to labor and management are identical both within 
and outside of contract negotiations. More specifically, there are two broad classes of tactics 
available to the parties: those that increase the opponent’s dependence, and those that decrease 
the actor’s own dependence. Each category can subsume a wide variety of specific tactics, but 
what is important to our discussion is the extent to which the actor employs one category of 
tactics versus the other. A union can engage primarily in tactics to increase management’s 
dependence or primarily in tactics to decrease its own dependence, and this choice will have a 
bearing on the long-term consequences of the tactical action. Examples of the former are union 
efforts to control the supply of workers to the employer or to control the training of workers 
already on the job. Examples of the latter are union efforts to build internal solidarity, 
accumulate strike funds, and provide job referral services to its members. Management has a 
similar choice of emphasis, and it is the conjoint tactical emphases of both labor and 
management that determine whether the power struggle has long-term integrative or 
disintegrative effects on the relationship. We will examine some tactic-countertactic sequences 
that are possible, assuming that both labor and management have these two options. 
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 When labor engages in an action that falls into one of these two categories, management 
is likely to respond with a tactical action that also fits into one of the two categories, and vice 
versa. In earlier work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, 141-73), we proposed that two types of 
responses are possible: blockage and matching. A blockage tactic attempts to forestall or prevent 
the action taken by the opponent. A union, for example, may attempt to prevent management 
from subcontracting; or an employer may fight the inclusion in the bargaining unit of highly 
skilled workers who are difficult to replace. If successful, blockage tactics maintain the existing 
power relationship or restore the status quo. An actor adopting matching tactics reciprocates the 
tactical action of its opponent, that is, the actor’s tactic falls into the same broad category as the 
opponent’s. For example, a union that adopts tactics that increase management’s dependence on 
the union might be confronted with reciprocal management actions that increase the union’s 
dependence on management. We have observed a tendency toward tactical reciprocation in our 
previous work on dependence theory (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981b); it has also been observed 
in the larger social psychological literature on tactics (Pruitt, 1981). Keep in mind that we are 
concerned here only with the emphasis actors place on one or the other of these two types of 
tactical action rather than with the specific tactics or with the multitude of ways in which actors 
might in fact use a combination of different tactics. We assume there is a dominant pattern of 
tactical action and seek to analyze the consequence of different dominant patterns. 
 The nature of the tactic-countertactic patterns and the effect of these patterns on the 
power relationship is presented in Figure 1. If the union attempts to increase management’s 
dependence and management responds with actions designed to decrease its dependence to a 
comparable degree, there is no change in the mutual dependence or “total power” in the 
relationship. If the union uses tactics designed to decrease its dependence on management and 
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management matches this action with tactics that decrease its dependence on the union, there is a 
decrease in mutual dependence (and total power). Finally, if the union uses tactics that increase 
management’s dependence on the union and management matches this action with tactics that 
increase the union’s dependence on management, there is an increase in the mutual dependence 
(and total power) of the actors. This discussion of tactical patterns assumes, of course, that over 
time both actors are equally effective in producing the predicted changes in dependence. 
Differences in the success of tactics used by the actors would produce shifts not just in the total 
power in the relationship, but also in the relative power of the union and management. 
 It should be clear from Figure 1 that-the dominant tactical patterns will determine the 
level of mutual dependence in the relationship over time. If both labor and management rely on 
tactics that increase the other’s dependence, mutual dependence will grow. We argue that the 
growth of mutual dependence will increase the potential for a more cooperative integrative 
bargaining relationship. On the other hand, if labor and management rely on tactics that decrease 
their dependence on each other, mutual dependence will decline over time, as will the ease of 
reaching agreements in contract negotiations. The ongoing power struggle between labor and 
management, therefore, can have either integrative or disintegrative effects on collective 
bargaining. Tactical action designed to achieve a power advantage can actually lay the 
foundation for more congenial labor-management relationships. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
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 Our discussion of tactical patterns illustrates how dependence theory offers a general 
framework for analyzing labor-management relations as a power struggle. A power struggle is 
the result of the parties’ attempts to change the existing power relationship, and in a labor-
management context such attempts are virtually inevitable. The tactic-countertactic sequence can 
take one of several general forms, each of which has a different effect on the mutual dependence 
of the actors. Dependence theory posits that the continual manipulation and maneuvering for 
position inherent in a power struggle need not have disintegrative effects on the relationship 
between the parties—in fact, certain patterns will create a greater sense of common interest. 
 
Paradox 4: Inferior Power Can Provide a Tactical Advantage 
 
 The commitment dimension of dependence theory has contradictory implications for the 
power and tactical actions of the actors. The theory stipulates that an actor who faces an 
opponent who is highly committed to the outcomes at issue will have more potential power than 
an actor who faces an opponent who is less committed. This proposition is quite consistent with 
common sense because the opponent’s high commitment reflects the fact that the actor controls 
outcomes of substantial value or importance to the opponent. The paradox is that high levels of 
commitment may also lead the opponent to expend more tactical effort to manipulate the actor 
and thereby to acquire the highly valued outcomes. An opponent with low power because of high 
commitment has every reason to engage in strenuous bargaining whereas an actor with less 
commitment to the outcomes may be more inclined to yield to the opponent who has a stronger 
commitment. Thus, a party with low power because of high commitment may yield less than 
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might be suggested by his inferior power, and a party with high power because of low 
commitment may yield more than would be predicted by his superior power. 
 Our previous research provides fairly consistent evidence in support of the effects of 
commitment on tactical effort. We have observed, for example, that when actors are highly 
committed to the outcomes at issue, they anticipate greater tactical success (Lawler and 
Bacharach, 1976; 1979) and offer smaller concessions in actual bargaining (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981a) than would otherwise be the case. 
 There appear to be two factors underlying the willingness of the-actor with higher power 
to yield in these situations. First, the lower-power actor will exert strong pressure for outcomes 
that are not valued highly by the higher-power actor; second, and related to the first, the higher-
power actor can yield with the expectation (tacit or otherwise) that the other actor will yield on 
other issues that are more important to the higher-power actor (that is, in negotiations over 
multiple issues, trade-offs are possible). Moreover, by yielding, the higher-power actor may 
convey an image of benevolence that improves the long-term relationship (and also the future 
power of the high-power actor, in light of our earlier discussion). Overall* under conditions of 
unequal commitments to the outcomes at issue, unmitigated pressure by the lower-power actor 
has some prospect of success simply because yielding by the higher-power actor is a low-cost act 
that may produce some long-term benefit. 
 Empirical evidence on the implications of commitment for tactical effort suggests that the 
two dimensions of dependence (alternatives and commitment) represent qualitatively distinct 
bases for power. Although high power on the alternatives dimension is clearly an advantage, and 
one that is likely to be manifested in the tactical success of the actors, high power on the 
commitment dimension is not inevitably an advantage. In sum, this paradox implies that it is a 
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fallacy to assume a perfect correspondence between the power relationship, tactical action, and 
bargaining outcomes. It also suggests the importance of placing the short-term aspects of 
bargaining in the context of the ongoing power struggle. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 In the 1950s Chamberlain (1951; 1955) argued that power is the “effective force” 
underlying the collective bargaining relationship. His conception implies that collective 
bargaining relationships are best characterized as power struggles. Both within and outside of 
actual contract negotiations, labor and management engage in relatively persistent efforts to 
enhance their own power and reduce the power of the other. The successful acquisition of a 
favorable power position at one particular time, however, does not assure its continuation. If one 
of the actors (either management or the union) has a power advantage, that advantage motivates 
the other to expend even greater effort to modify the power relationship. The nature of the power 
relationship is likely to fluctuate substantially over time because of such tactical maneuvering 
and because inherent ambiguity about the nature of the “true” power relationship makes 
cognitive manipulations likely. 
 This paper and our larger program of work can be construed as efforts to revive and 
develop further some of the basic assumptions found in the classic work of Chamberlain. The 
uniqueness of our work lies in its tactical emphasis, its view of power as a cognitive 
phenomenon, and its adaptation of dependence theory. The primary object of this paper was to 
show that dependence theory can and should transcend the usual focus on contract negotiations 
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and instead analyze the ongoing power struggle. The theory provided a framework for examining 
the connection between particular contract negotiations and the continuing power struggle. 
 Each of the paradoxes discussed in this paper suggests that tactical action within contract 
negotiations can have unintended effects on the ongoing power relationships: A union that makes 
substantial concessions at time 1 will increase its power at time 2 if the concessions at time 1 
increase management’s dependence on the union; a union that adopts coercive tactics over time 
may in the process gradually erode its power by making alternative outcome sources (such as 
subcontracting) more viable for management; if both union and management stress tactical 
efforts to increase the other’s dependence, mutual dependence will increase over time and, other 
things equal, relations between the actors should become more harmonious; and finally, actors 
who have less power may exercise tactics to develop more influence than is indicated by their 
inferior power, in part because the higher-power actor can increase his future power by yielding 
in the short run. Because dependence theory raises such issues and provides general theoretical 
answers, it is a useful framework for analyzing the tactical processes of bargaining. 
 The core ideas of dependence theory are not new. They are implicit or explicit in both the 
social psychological (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Cook and Emerson, 
1978) and collective bargaining (Chamberlain, 1951; Walton and McKersie, 1965) literatures, 
and some can be traced to or couched in terms of elementary economics or psychology. We hope 
this paper demonstrates, however, that the simple ideas of dependence theory have a wide range 
of applications and are particularly useful for a tactical analysis of the power struggle between 
labor and management. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Our approach adopts a tactical emphasis, but it does not really distinguish strategy from 
tactics. The term tactics refers to actions that are designed to influence the other party, namely, 
the moves and countermoves intended to manipulate the opposition. The tactics of primary 
concern to dependence theory are those that modify the power relationship or the opponent’s 
perception of it. (See Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, chap. 7, for a classification of tactics.) * 
2. To say that bargainers are “imperfect calculators” is to say that their thought process is 
one of “bounded rationality” (see Allison, 1971; Simon, 1961). Nevertheless, we treat rationality 
as a form of thinking (namely, means-ends calculation) divorced from any particular content (see 
Lawler and Bacharach, 1983). This treatment suggests that the primary difference between 
“bounded” and “comprehensive” (unbounded) rationality is the content to which the form of 
thinking is applied rather than the degree of “rationality.” 
 
  
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
  
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        32 
 
References 
 
Allison, G.T. 1971. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little Brown and Co. 
Bacharach, S.B., and E.J. Lawler. 1976 The Perception of Power. Social Forces 55:123-34.  
Bacharach, S.B., and E.J. Lawler. 1980. Power and Politics in Organizations: The Social 
Psychology of Conflict, Coalitions, and Bargaining. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Bacharach, S.B., and E.J. Lawler. 1981a. Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Bacharach, S.B., and E.J. Lawler. 1981b. Power and Tactics in Bargaining. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 34:219-33. 
Bierstedt, R. 1950. An Analysis of Social Power. American Sociological Review 15:730-38.  
Blau, P.M. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley. 
Blumer, H. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Chamberlain, N.W. 1951. Collective Bargaining. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Chamberlain, N.W. 1955. A General Theory of Economic Process. New York: Harper & Row. 
Cook, K.S., and R.M. Emerson. 1978. Power, Equity, and Commitment in Exchange Networks. 
American Sociological Review 43:721-39. 
Cook, K.S., and R.M. Emerson. 1984. Exchange Networks and the Analysis of Complex 
Organizations. In Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 3: The Social 
Psychological Processes, ed. S.B. Bacharach and E.J. Lawler. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI 
Press. 
Dahl, R.A. 1957. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2:201-18. 
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        33 
 
Deutsch, M. 1973. The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Dunlop, J.T. 1950. Wage Determination Under Trade Unions. New York: A.M. Kelley. 
Emerson, R.M. 1962. Power-Dependence Relations. American Sociological Review 27:3140. 
Emerson, R.M. 1972. Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations, Exchange Networks, and 
Groups as Exchange Systems. In Sociological Theories in Progress, vol. 2., ed. J. Berger, 
M. Zelditch, and B. Anderson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
French, J.R., Jr., and B.H. Raven. 1959. The Bases of Social Power. In Studies in Social Power, 
ed. D. Cartwright. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Gamson, W.A. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood, 111: Dorsey Press. 
Hage, J. 1972. Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction in Sociology. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Harsanyi, J.C. 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social 
Situations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kochan, T.A. 1980. Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations. Homewood, 111: Richard 
D. Irwin. 
Lawler, E.J., and S.B. Bacharach. 1976. “Outcome Alternatives and Value as Criteria for 
Multistrategy Evaluations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34:885-94. 
Lawler, E.J., and S.B. Bacharach. 1979. Power-Dependence in Individual Bargaining: The 
Expected Utility of Influence. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 32:196-204. 
Lawler, E.J., and S.B. Bacharach. 1983. Political Action and Alignments in Organizations. 
Sociology of Organizations, vol. 2, ed. S.B. Bacharach, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. 
Lewin, D., and P. Feuille. 1983 Behavioral Research in Industrial Relations. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 36:341-60. 
Power Dependence in Collective Bargaining        34 
 
Lindblom, C.E. 1948. Bargaining Power in Price and Wage Determinism. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 62:396-417. 
Pen, J. 1959. The Wage Rate Under Collective Bargaining. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Pruitt, D.G. 1981. Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic Press. 
Rubin, J.A., and B.R. Brown. 1975. The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Schelling, T.C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Simon, H.A. 1961. Administrative Behaviors. New York: Macmillan. 
Stevens, C.M. 1963. Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press. 
Stinchcombe, A.L. 1968. Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Tedeschi, J.T., and T.V. Bonoma. 1972. Power and Influence: An Introduction. In Social 
Influence Processes, ed. J. T. Tedeschi. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine. 
Tedeschi, J.T., B.R. Schlenker, and T.V. Bonoma. 1973. Conflict, Power, and Games. 
Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine. 
Thibaut, J.W., and H.H. Kelley. 1959. The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: Wiley. 
Walton, R.E., and R.B. McKersie. 1965. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Wrong, D.H. 1968. Some Problems in Defining Social Power. American Journal of Sociology 73 
(6):673-81. 
Young, O.R. ed., 1975. Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation. Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press. 
